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Abstract. Since the publication of Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations, it has
been customary among economists to presume that economic agents are purely self-
interested. However, research in experimental and behavioral economics has shown that
human motivation is more complex and that observed behavior is often better explained
by additional motivational factors such as a concern for fairness, social welfare etc. As a
complement to that body of work we have carried out theoretical investigations into the
evolutionary foundations of human motivation (Alger andWeibull 2013, 2016). We found
that natural selection, in starkly simplied but mathematically well-structured environ-
ments, favors preferences that combine self-interest with morality. Roughly speaking,
the moral component evaluates ones own action in terms of what would happen, if, hy-
pothetically, this action were adopted by others. Such moral preferences have important
implications for economic behavior. They motivate individuals to contribute to public
goods, to give fair o¤ers when they could get away with cheap o¤ers, and to contribute
to social institutions and act in environmentally friendly ways even if their individual
impact is negligible.
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that
it should become a universal law.
[Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, 1785]
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One general law, leading to the advancement of all organic beings, namely, mul-
tiply, vary, let the strongest live and the weakest die.
[Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, 1859]
1. Introduction
The academic discipline of economics has over many years provided policy-makers all over the
world with a powerful toolbox. Conceptual, philosophical and methodological disagreements
are relatively rare and the discipline is not torn by ghts between disparate schools of thought.
Whether this monolithic character of the eld is a sign of strength or weakness is not easy to
say, but this methodological unity and power has, arguably, given the discipline great inuence
on policy. The strong methodological core of economics, in the 1950s-1960s epitomized by
general equilibrium theory, and later incorporating game theory, has enabled positive and
normative analysis of a wide range of economic and social issues.
So what, more exactly, does this core consist of? In a nutshell, it has two main components.
The rst is that it views economic agents who may be individuals, households, rms, or
organizations as goal-oriented; as if they each had some goal function that they strive to
maximize under the constraints they face, the information they have, and given their beliefs
about relevant aspects of the world they live in. The second component is that interactions
between these economic agents are taken to meet certain consistency requirements, formalized
as equilibria, that is, collections of action plans, one for each agent, such that no agent can
unilaterally improve the expected value of her goal function (usually prot or utility).
Both components can, and have been, contested. Individuals may not be so systematic
and consistent, and interactions may be chaotic and volatile. Having a theoretically well-
founded and empirically accurate understanding of human motivation is, arguably, in any
case of utmost relevance for analysis and policy recommendations.
Among the more noticeable new methodological developments in economics is the emer-
gence of behavioral and experimental economics, where the rst strand endows economic
agents with richer motivations than in traditional economics, usually in the form of pro-social
or other-regarding preferences. The second strand tests such models, old and new, in con-
trolled laboratory experiments and in randomized eld experiments. The external validity of
laboratory experiments can be questioned, and eld experiments may depend on local and
historical factors with little generality, but this development of the discipline of economics, to-
wards an empirically founded science, appears as essentially very healthy. It was not long ago
that economics was thought of as similar to meteorology and astronomy in that all it could do
was to observe what is happening, without possibility to experiment. Moving away from mere
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observation of data that happen to come about to carefully designed controlled experiments,
reminds of the way Galileo Galilei once lead the way from Aristotelean scholastic discourse to
modern science.
While behavioral and experimental economics no doubt will improve the predictive power
and the usefulness of economics, further improvements could certainly be made if the under-
lying factors that shape human motivation were better understood. The literature on the
evolutionary foundations of human motivation aims at providing such understanding, by ask-
ing: What preferences should humans be expected to have if these are transmitted in society,
from generation to generation? If certain pro-social or anti-social preferences, or moral values,
give their carriers on average better material outcomes than other preferences or values (all
else being equal), then one would expect the former to spread in the population (be it by
biological or cultural mechanisms). Our aim in this essay is to discuss a recent theoretical
result concerning such evolutionary preference selection and to examine its implications for a
range of social and economic issues.
Milton Friedman (1953) claimed that unless the behavior of businessmen in some way or
other approximated behavior consistent with the maximization of returns, it seems unlikely
that they would remain in business for long. In a similar vein, one may claim that unless the
behavior of an individual is consistent with the maximization of own material payo¤s, other,
materially more successful behaviors, will take over in the interacting population. Economists
have shown that this claim is theoretically valid when (i) the population at hand is very large,
(ii) interacting individuals do not know each others goal functions, and (iii) interactions are
perfectly random in the sense that each encounter is just as likely (Ok and Vega-Redondo,
2001; Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007).
In reality, however, populations are not always large, and interacting individuals some-
times know or learn about each others preferences think, for instance, of the great number
of interactions that take place within families or small communities. It has been shown that
in such settings preferences or goal functions can usually serve as e¤ective commitment de-
vices and evolution will almost always favor goal functions that di¤er from own material
payo¤s.1 Furthermore and this is what we will focus on here encounters are only rarely
perfectly random; geographic location, language, culture and religion often have an impact
on the likelihood of specic encounters. For example, business partners may know each other
from college, and neighbors may have chosen to live in the same place because they share
socioeconomic or cultural background and/or location preferences etc. In such structured
1Seminal articles on preference evolution, or indirect evolution, are Frank (1987) and Güth and Yaari
(1992). See also Banerjee and Weibull (1995), Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2007), and Alger and Weibull
(2010).
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populations, some encounters are more likely than others, even if the overall population is
large. In two recent theoretical studies (Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), we show that such
assortative matching makes evolution favor individuals who are not purely self-interested but
who attach some value to doing the right thing, even though the population is large and
interacting individuals do not know each others preferences. This, for us initially surprising
nding suggests an evolutionary foundation for a psychologically plausible form of morality,
in line with Immanuel Kants categorical imperative.
In the next section we describe this novel class of preferences and their evolutionary foun-
dations. In Section 3 we discuss the implications of such preferences for a number of much
studied social and economic behavior and policy issues, including public goods provision,
and behaviors that a¤ect the environment. Section 4 discusses other social preferences and
contrasts morality with altruism. Section 5 concludes.
2. Evolution and Kantian morality
Imagine a population that has evolved for many generations in a stationary environment,
and that in each generation individuals engage in some social or economic interaction. For
instance, in a population of self-subsistence farmers, the interaction could be team-work in
the elds, the extraction of resources from a commonly owned lake or piece of land, lending
activities, or the maintenance of institutions. In Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016), we propose
a theoretical model of precisely such populations. We formalize the interaction by assuming
that individuals are now and then randomly matched into groups of arbitrary (but xed and
given) size n to interact with each other within the group. (There are no interactions between
groups and hence no group selection takes place.). The interaction may involve elements of
cooperation and/or conict, asymmetric information, repetition or interaction of arbitrary
duration, possibility of helping, rewarding and/or punishing others etc. There are essentially
only two restrictions imposed on the interaction. First, the material payo¤ consequences to
a participant depend only on the participants own actions and on some aggregate of other
group membersactions (not on who of them does what). In game theory such interactions
are called aggregative games. Examples are market competition where only competitors
aggregate output or lowest price matter, contributions to public goods where only the sum
of otherscontributions matter, some environmental externalities etc. Second, the material
payo¤ function is the same for all individuals.
We follow standard economic theory by assuming that each individual acts so as to max-
imize his or her expected utility. There may be di¤erent utility functions present in the
population. Depending on the preference distribution and on the process by which interaction
groups are formed, individuals may end up in more or less homogeneous groups. For a given
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material interaction, a given preference distribution, and a given group formation process,
the average material payo¤ consequences for individuals with a particular utility function are
well determined in each equilibrium. In our evolutionary stability analysis we ask what kind
of utility function, if any, would be favored by natural selection. Specically, we determine
which such functions are evolutionarily stable in the sense that, if almost all individuals in the
population have such preferences, these individuals would materially outperform individuals
with other preferences. Thus, the material payo¤s are taken to be the drivers of evolution.
This approach is a generalization of the work of Maynard Smith and Price (1973), from the
notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy, or ESS, to that of an evolutionarily stable utility
function.2 A major challenge arises with this generalization. In any population state the
preference distribution in the population there may be multiple equilibrium behaviors, and
hence several possible material payo¤ allocations. We dene a utility function to be evolu-
tionarily stable against another utility function if in every population state where the latter
utility function is rare, individuals equipped with the former utility function outperform those
with the latter in terms of the resulting material payo¤s in all equilibria.3 Conversely, a
utility function is evolutionarily unstable if there exists another utility function such that, no
matter how small its population share, there is some equilibrium in which the latter utility
function materially outperforms the former. In both denitions, the test scenario is to let in a
small population share of mutants, who may be migrants or carriers of spontaneously and
randomly arising alternative utility functions, into the population of incumbents or residents.
We impose minimal constraints on the nature of potential utility functions. They are not
required to take any particular parametric form or even to depend on the material payo¤s.
Hence, individuals may be selsh, altruistic, spiteful, fairness-minded, inequity averse, envi-
ronmentalists, moralists, etc. Our only assumption is that each individuals utility function
is continuous in all group memberscourses of action.
A second key feature of our approach is that it allows the random matching to be as-
sortative. Geographic, cultural, linguistic and socioeconomic distance imposes (literal or
metaphoric) transportation costs, which imply that (1) individuals tend to interact more
with individuals in their (geographic, cultural, linguistic or socioeconomic) vicinity,4 and (2)
cultural or genetic transmission of types (say, behavior patterns, preferences or moral values)
from one generation to the next also has a tendency to take place in the vicinity of where the
2In our approach it is thus as if mother nature delegates to individuals to choose their actions, and
instead equips them with goal functions that will guide their choice of action.
3By equilibriumwe mean Bayesian Nash equilibrium under incomplete information.
4Homophily has been documented by sociologists (e.g., McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook, 2001, and
Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter, 2003) and economists (e.g., Currarini, Jackson, and Pin, 2009, 2010).
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type originated.5 Taken together, these two tendencies imply that individuals who interact
with each other are likely to be of the same type. We formalize such potential assortativity in
the random matching process in terms of a vector we call the assortativity prole. This vector
consists of probabilities for the events that none, some, or all individuals in a vanishingly rare
mutants group also are mutants.6
Our analysis delivers two main results. First, although we impose virtually no restrictions
on permissible utility functions, evolution favors a particular class of utility functions, which
we call Homo moralis. Individuals with preferences in this class attach some weight to their
own material payo¤ but also to what can be interpreted as a probabilistically generalized
version of Kantian morality. In his Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785), Immanuel
Kant wrote Act only according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that
it should become a universal law.Similarly, Homo moralis attaches some weight to the goal
of acting according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should
become a universal law, even if followed only probabilistically by others. More precisely,
a Homo moralis individual in a group of arbitrary size n maximizes a weighted average of
equally many terms, indexed j = 0; : : : ; n  1, where each term is the material payo¤ that she
would obtain if, hypothetically, she could replace the strategies of j other individuals in the
group by her strategy. We call the vector of these probability weights the individuals morality
prole.
The class of Homo moralis preferences has two extremes: Homo oeconomicus, who con-
siders only her own material payo¤,7 and Homo kantiensis, who considers only the material
payo¤ that she would obtain if all others were to act like she does. In between these two
extremes there is a whole range of Homo moralis preferences with di¤erent morality proles
whereby an individual examines what would happen if some but not all the others were to
5In biology, the concept of assortativity is known as relatedness, and the propensity to interact with
individuals locally is nicely captured in the innite island model, originally due to Wright (1931). Hamilton
(1964) provided a rst formalization of what is now known as Hamiltons rule: that evolution will select for
behaviors whereby the external e¤ects on others are internalized at a rate provided by the relatedness (see also
Dawkins, 1976, for a popular account of this idea, as well as Rousset, 2004, for a comprehensive treatment).
In an article on the evolution of behaviors in interactions between siblings, Bergstrom (1995) was probably
the rst to bring Hamiltons rule into the economics literature.
6This generalizes Bergstroms (2003) denition of the index of assortativity for pairwise encounters. See
also Bergstrom (2012) and Alger and Weibull (2013) for further discussions of assortativity under pairwise
matchings.
7Note that we dene Homo oeconomicus as individuals who always seek to maximize their own material
payo¤. Some writers dene Homo oeconomicus, or economic man more generally as an individual who
always acts in accordance with some goal function, whether this be pure self-interest or not. All agents in the
present study are varieties of Homo oeconomicus in this broad sense.
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act like him- or herself. Homo moralis partly evaluates her own actions in this probabilistic
Kantian sense. In other words, she is to some extent concerned with the morality of her own
acting, irrespective of what others do. She asks herself, before taking her action, what action
would she prefer if, hypothetically, also others would probabilistically choose the same action
in her situation?
Our rst main result is that Homo moralis with morality prole identical with the as-
sortativity prole is evolutionarily stable. The intuition behind this result is not based on
group selection, an old argument (appearing already in Charles Darwins writings, see also
Alexander, 1987) that essentially says that evolution will lead to behaviors that enhance the
survival of the group. Quite on the contrary; the intuition is that natural selection will lead to
utility functions that preempt entry into the population in the sense that the best a potential
rare mutant can do, if striving for material payo¤, is to mimic the residents.
Our second main result is that any preferences that are behaviorally distinct from those of
Homo moralis with the stable morality prole are evolutionarily unstable. Hence, although we
made no parametric or structural assumption about utility functions, it appears that natural
selection as represented by evolutionary stability in our abstract and simplied framework
favors the utility function of Homo moralis. In particular, our results imply that Homo oeco-
nomicus pure material self-interest is evolutionarily unstable under any random matching
process with positive assortativity. Rare mutants may indeed garner a higher material payo¤
than Homo oeconomicus, on average, by behaving somewhat pro-socially, because when there
is positive assortativity the benets of this pro-social behavior is sometimes bestowed on other
mutants, whereas the residents almost never benet from it.
Homo moralis is easily dened for pairwise interactions, n = 2. Let  (x; y) denote the
material payo¤ to an individual who plays strategy x when the opponent plays strategy y.
Then the utility function of Homo moralis is
U (x; y) = (1  )   (x; y) +    (x; x) , (1)
where 0    1 is the individuals degree of morality. The two extreme degrees of morality
represent Homo oeconomicus ( = 0) and Homo kantiensis ( = 1), respectively, and interme-
diate degrees of morality correspond to individuals who attach some weight to own material
payo¤,  (x; y), and some weight to the right thing to do if everyone were to choose the same
behavior,  (x; x).
For n > 2 the precise denition of Homo moralis is fairly involved,8 but it is analytically
straight-forward in the special case when the random matching is such that the types of any
other two group members are statistically independent, given the members own type. The
8The general denition of Homo moralis is given in an appendix at the end of this essay.
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morality prole is then a binomial distribution and the utility function of a Homo moralis
individual i is the expected value of is material payo¤ if, hypothetically, other members of
the group would randomly and statistically independently switch to use is strategy with
probability , which is then is degree of morality. At one end of the interval of such Homo
moralis,  = 0, we nd Homo oeconomicus, while at the other end,  = 1, we nd Homo
kantiensis. Moreover, in large groups, the share of mutants in a mutants group is, by the
de Moivre - Laplace Theorem, approximately normally distributed with mean value  and
variance  (1  ) = (n  1). Hence, the share of other mutants is then almost deterministic
and equal to . A Homo moralis with degree of morality  then acts (approximately) as if she
hypothetically assumed that her behavior were to become, if not a universal law, a random
lawapplying to a randomly sampled share of size  out of her groups other members.9
It is worth noting that the utility function of Homo moralis di¤ers sharply from any
utility function that only depends on the payo¤s to all participants, such as altruism, inequity
aversion, or a concern for social e¢ ciency. We illustrate this by way of a simple example at
the end of Section 4.
While morality and ethics in connection with economics have been discussed at great
length by many economists and philosophers, including Smith (1759), Edgeworth (1881),
Rawls (1971), Arrow (1973), Sen (1977), and Harsanyi (1979), to mention a few, Homo moralis
preferences have, to the best of our knowledge not been studied, or even known, before, with
one exception. Bergstrom (1995) shows that evolutionary stability of strategies in interactions
between siblings induces behavior which he calls semi-Kantian, and which correspond to
 = 1=2 in our equation (1).10
3. Kantian morality and economics
Economistspolicy advice traditionally relies on models in which individuals have Homo oe-
conomicus preferences. What if economistsmodels instead were populated by the more
general Homo moralis? In this essay, we will merely scratch the surface by studying but a few
examples. A more thorough investigation has to be left for future research.
9This claim is not fully general and deserves further analysis, since even small perturbations of continuous
(utility) functions may lead to jumpsin behavior.
10Bergstrom thus di¤ers from us in studying stability of strategies rather than of utility functions. However,
in Alger and Weibull (2013, Corollary 5), we establish a link between these approaches by showing that Homo
moralis equilibrium strategies are stable under strategy evolution. For a discussion of several ethical principles
in relation to strategy evolution, see Bergstrom (2009).
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3.1. Trust. There is variation across countries in the extent to which people are trusting,
and trust is correlated with economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2010).11 In economics,
the so-called trust game has been used extensively in controlled laboratory experiments as a
way to measure trust and trustworthiness in di¤erent countries and cultures. This literature
was pioneered by Berg et al. (1995) and has received a lot of attention among behavioral
economists and experimentalists. The trust game is succinctly described by Cesarini et al.
(2008):
Many mutually benecial transactions involve an element of interpersonal trust and may
fail to materialize in the absence of an expectation that trust will be reciprocated. The
prevalence of trust in a society has therefore been assigned primacy in a number of domains,
for instance empirical and theoretical studies of economic growth. In recent years, the trust
game has emerged as a favorite instrument to elicit an individuals interpersonal trust and
willingness to reciprocate trust. More generally, the game has been widely used to study
cooperative behavior. In a trust game, an individual (the investor) decides how much money
out of an initial endowment to send to another subject (the trustee). The sent amount is
then multiplied by some factor, usually three, and the trustee decides how much of the money
received to send back to the investor. The standard game-theoretic prediction for a single
anonymous interaction between two purely self-interested individuals is for the investor to
send nothing, rationally anticipating that the trustee will not reciprocate. Yet, experiments
consistently show that cooperation ourishes in the trust game; the average investor sends a
signicant share of her endowment, and most trustees reciprocate.(op. cit., p. 3721)
What will Homo moralis do in such an interaction? Consider a situation in which two ex
ante identical individuals are randomly paired. With equal chance, one of them is o¤ered an
endowment and an investment opportunity as described above. The other individual then has
to act in the role of the trustee. A strategy for an individual in such a symmetric interaction
then has two components. First, if given the endowment, what share s 2 [0; 1] of it to invest.
Second, if not given the investment opportunity, what payback rulep 2 [0; 1] to use, where
such a payback rule prescribes for any invested share t 2 [0; 1] chosen by the other party what
share p of the gross return to pay back. Let u (c) be an individuals hedonic utility from own
consumption c, and take this to represent the material payo¤ in our evolutionary framework.
In the standard version of the trust game, the material payo¤ from using a strategy x = (s; p)
11A situation where trust is key is that of informal personal lending. In many developing countries, large
fractions of the populations are still shut out from formal credit markets, see e.g. Kendall et al. (2010). Then
informal lending, in the form of not legally binding loans between individuals, can sometimes be enforced by
the threat of future non-renewal of lending (Ghosh and Ray, 2016) and/or social disapproval. Evidence from
laboratory experiments suggests that such informal lending may in fact even take place in one-shot interactions
(Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006). The trust game we analyze here can be interpreted as informal lending.
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when the other individual uses strategy y = (t; q) is then
 (x; y) =
1
2
u (1  s+ 3sq) + 1
2
u (3t  3tp) : (2)
In an interaction between two Homo oeconomicus, no party is trustworthy; they will choose
p = q = 0 for all s; t > 0. Thus, if each party know the others type, no investment is made in
equilibrium (t = s = 0). The resulting expected material payo¤ to each party is u (1) =2, the
probability of being given the initial endowment times the utility from keeping it. If instead
both parties were Homo kantiensis, then they would each invest all the money if given the
opportunity (t = s = 1), and return half the gross return; use payback rules p and q such
that p = q = 0:5. The resulting expected material payo¤ to each party is then u (1:5), much
higher than what Homo oeconomicus obtains.
Full morality is not necessary in order to induce full investment, however. In a pair of
equally moral Homo moralis, full investment (s = t = 1) obtains in equilibrium for any
su¢ ciently high degree of morality, although as soon as morality is less than full ( < 1), the
trustee pays back less than half the gross returns from investment, in which case the trustee
ends up being better o¤ than the investor. As the degree of morality  falls, the amount paid
back decreases, and it eventually falls short of the amount originally invested, in which case
the investor makes a material loss; nonetheless, morality makes the investor accept this loss
and invest anyway, up to some point.12 Indeed, for su¢ ciently low degrees of morality the
investor invests less than his full endowment, and eventually, when morality drops below a
certain level, he invests nothing.
3.2. Public goods. A host of situations that are important for economic growth may be
represented as situations in which people can make voluntary contributions towards a public
good, including the generation and dissemination of knowledge, and institution building. We
examine the behavior of individuals in a community of n members, each of whom is in a
position to make a voluntary contribution to a public good (the contribution may be monetary
or in kind). A standard concern in economics is that free-riding is enhanced as groups become
larger, so our aim here is to analyze how group size a¤ects the behavior of homo moralis.
Suppose, then, that i obtains material payo¤
 (xi;y) = B

xi +
X
j 6=i
yj

  C (xi) (3)
if she makes the contribution xi and the sum of the contributions from the other community
members is
P
yj. Here B is a production function for the public good and C a cost function
12To see this, note that the derivative of U (x; y), where x = (s; p), y = (t; q), with respect to s, and
evalutated when t = s = 1, is positive even for p < 1=3 for  < 1 large enough.
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for a contributing individual representing foregone private consumption, income, or leisure.
We take the marginal cost of making a contribution to be increasing and the marginal benet
of the aggregate contribution to be decreasing.
Consider rst the socially optimal individual contribution, x. With a conventional pro-
duction function of the power form B (X) = Xa, where 0 < a < 1, the necessary rst-order
condition for the sum of all membersmaterial payo¤s to be maximized,
nB0 (nx) = C 0 (x) ; (4)
implies that the socially optimal individual contribution x is increasing in n. By contrast, in
a community of Homo oeconomicus, the rst-order condition for the unique Nash equilibrium
contribution, x^0, writes
B0 (nx^0) = C 0 (x^0) ; (5)
which implies that in communities with more members, each individual contributes less. As
a consequence, free-riding the tendency for people to under-provide public goods is exac-
erbated when group size increases. The intuition is that if all contributions were to remain
unchanged then the marginal benet from each contribution would fall. Thus, each individual
will have a weaker incentive to contribute.
Suppose now instead that everyone in the community is a Homo moralis with the same
degree of morality  2 [0; 1]. Then their unique individual equilibrium contribution, x^, can
be shown to satisfy
[1 + (n  1)] B0 (nx^) = C 0 (x^) : (6)
For any positive degree of morality, group size has two counter-acting e¤ects on the individual
contribution. The negative e¤ect is, as before, due to the decreasing marginal productivity.
The positive e¤ect is that in larger groups each individuals contribution benets a larger
number of individuals. The right thing to do, as the group increases, is thus to increase
ones contribution. The positive e¤ect may outweigh the negative.
To see this, consider again the conventional production function used above, and note that
for purely Kantian individuals ( = 1) the individual contribution always increases with n.
For intermediate values of , the individual contribution decreases with n when small, but
increases with n when large. Figure 1 below shows the equilibrium contribution of Homo
moralis with degree of morality  as a function of community size n, with higher curves for
higher degrees of morality (when B (X) =
p
X, C (x) = x2).
These predictions may potentially help explain observations made in laboratory experi-
ments, in which group size sometimes has a positive e¤ect and sometimes a negative e¤ect on
individual contributions (see Nosenzo, Quercia, and Sefton, 2015, for a review).
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Does the extent of free riding increase or decrease as group size increases? In the parametric
specication used in Figure 1, the individual contribution relative to the rst-best contribution
is
x^
x
=

+
1  
n
2=3
; (7)
a ratio that decreases as group size n increases (for any given degree of morality  < 1).13 A
smaller ratio indicates more free riding, so this equation shows that as morality () increases,
the e¤ect of group size (n) on the extent of free riding declines.14 Moreover, the extent of free
riding is bounded from below; as seen in (7), the ratio x^=x exceeds 2=3 for all group sizes n.
Hence, compared to the outcome under Homo oeconomicus, an important policy implication
is that, when  is positive, the contributions from Homo moralis decline less with group size,
and remains positive even in innitely large groups.
Figure 1: The unique Nash equilibrium contribution in the
public-goods game for di¤erent degrees of morality
3.3. Environmental economics. According to World Bank president Jim Yong Kim,
If we dont confront climate change, we wont end poverty.15 A number of instruments
have been proposed to help mitigate climate change, such as a carbon tax, regulation of
production technologies, subsidies to public transportation, and support to R&D concerning
environmentally friendly technologies for di¤erent forms of green energy, etc. Determining the
rightcarbon tax requires knowing how it will a¤ect behavior and welfare. Here we briey
analyze the behavior of Homo oeconomicus and, more generally, Homo moralis, in a standard
model of consumption that has an external e¤ect on the environment (Musgrave, 1959, Arrow,
13Formally, d (x^=x) =dn < 0 when 0 <   1.
14Formally: d2 (x^=x) =(dnd) > 0.
15See http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/03/03/climate-change-a¤ects-poorest-developing-
countries
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1970). In this model, the group is taken to be so large that each individuals impact on the
groups environment is negligible.
More specically, there is a continuum of consumers, indexed i 2 I = [0; 1], and there
are two consumption goods, goods 1 and 2, where good 1 is environmentally neutral (that
is, its consumption has no e¤ect on the environment) and good 2 is environmentally harmful.
Aggregate consumption of these goods are
X1 =
Z
I
x1 (i) d and X2 =
Z
I
x2 (i) d,
where x (i) = (x1 (i) ; x2 (i)) is the consumption bundle of individual i, and  is a density on
I. Since all consumers are innitesimally small, aggregate consumption is una¤ected by any
individuals personal consumption.
We take the material payo¤ to each individual i to be that individuals hedonic utility from
own consumption, x (i), and from the quality of the environment, which in turn depends on ag-
gregate consumption, X2, of the environmentally harmful good. We write u (x1 (i) ; x2 (i) ; X2)
for this hedonic utility and assume that it is increasing in consumption of each good and
decreasing in aggregate consumption of the environmentally harmful good. Using good 1 as
numeraire, writing p for the price of good 2, and assuming that all individuals have the same
income, a socially e¢ cient consumption bundle, x, the same for all individuals i, satises
u2 (x

1; x

2; X

2 )
u1 (x1; x

2; X

2 )
= p  u3 (x

1; x

2; X

2 )
u1 (x1; x

2; X

2 )
; (8)
where subscripts on the personal utility function denote partial derivatives. The marginal
rate of substitution between the environmentally harmful and environmentally neutral goods
should thus equal the relative price of the harmful good net of the marginal rate of substitution
between the utility from the quality of the environment and the neutral good. In other words,
social e¢ ciency requires that, at given prices, consumers consume less of a good the more
harmful it is to the environment.
By contrast, in a population consisting entirely of Homo oeconomicus, an (interior) equi-
librium allocation in which everybody consumes the same bundle x0 necessarily satises the
rst-order condition
u2 (x
0
1; x
0
2; X
0
2 )
u1 (x01; x
0
2; X
0
2 )
= p: (9)
Under decreasing marginal utility of consumption, this means that Homo oeconomicus, not
surprisingly, consumes more of the environmentally harmful good than required by socially
e¢ ciency.
As observed above, for interactions in innitely large groups the utility function of an
individual Homo moralis with degree of morality  2 [0; 1] is the material payo¤ that would
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obtain if a share  of the group would behave in the same way as the individual herself or
himself. In the present context, if an individual consumes the bundle x = (x1; x2) and all the
others consume some bundle y = (y1; y2), then the utility to a Homo moralis with degree of
morality  would be
U (x; y) = u (x1; x2; (1  ) y2 + x2) ;
where, in this expression, we have normalized the total mass of individuals in the group
(which could be a village, region, country, continent, or the whole world) to unity. In a
group consisting entirely of Homo moralis with the same degree of morality , an (interior)
equilibrium allocation, everybody consumes the same bundle x, and this satises the rst-
order condition
u2 (x

1 ; x

2 ; x

2)
u1 (x1 ; x

2 ; x

2)
= p    u3 (x

1 ; x

2 ; x

2)
u1 (x1 ; x

2 ; x

2)
: (10)
Compared to Homo oeconomicus, for any positive degree of morality  each individual refrains
somewhat from consuming the environmentally harmful good, although each individual
knowing that she is negligible is fully aware that her own consumption has no e¤ect on
the overall quality of the environment! Hence, if people are in fact somewhat moral, then
policy advice based on models inhabited by Homo oeconomicus may exaggerate the need
for pecuniary incentives such as carbon taxes. If people are more like Homo moralis with
some positive degree of morality, then, in addition to some carbon taxes it may be e¤ective
to provide individuals with information about how aggregate consumption (and production)
creates carbon dioxide and (what we know about) how this a¤ects the climate.16 By contrast,
such information would in this stylized example have no e¤ect at all upon the behavior of
Homo oeconomicus.17
3.4. Voting. Another class of situations in which Homo moralis may make a di¤erence is
collective decision-making by voting. By and large, countries with more developed economies
tend to have more democratic political systems (see, e.g., Persson and Tabellini, 2006, and
Acemoglu et al., 2014). In order for democracy to work, it is important that citizens participate
in elections, committee work etc., and it is still much debated in economics and political science
why and how people vote. As has been pointed out by economists, high participation rates
in large elections appear incompatible with rational Homo oeconomicus behavior. The reason
being that the act of voting usually has some personal cost, say lost income or leisure, and this
16We note that equations (8) and (9) are the special cases of (10) when  = 0 (Homo oeconomicus) and
 = 1 (Homo kantiensis). La¤ont (1975) considers these two extreme cases.of self-interested individuals (our
Homo oeconomicus) and Kantian individuals(our Homo kantiensis).
17Note further that if good 2 would not cause any externality (u3 = 0), then Homo moralis would behave
precisely as the classical Homo oeconomicus; equation (10) would boil down to equation (9). For such goods
there is no right thing to do,and hence, morality has no bite.
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cost easily outweighs the expected benet to the individual of participating in the election,
since the probability of being pivotal is virtually nil. This is the well-known votersparadox.
Despite this, the turn-out in general and local elections in many countries is many times
impressive. So what then motivates people to participate in elections? Can Homo moralis
provide an explanation?
A closely related, and arguably equally important issue is participation and voting in com-
mittees, such as parliamentary bodies, company boards, court juries, central bank boards
etc. As shown by Austen-Smith and Banks (1996), when committee members have private
information and are Homo oeconomicus, then voting may fail to aggregate information e¢ -
ciently even when they have the same preferences. This observation challenges the so-called
Condorcet Jury Theorem (Condorcet, 1785), which states that democracy in the form of ma-
jority rule in such situations is a great institution since it implies that the right decision is
almost always taken if the electorate is large enough. How would Homo moralis vote in such
committees?
4. Other social preferences
Theoretical work on the evolutionary foundations of human motivation provides insights about
potential ultimate causes of human behavior the forces in the environment that have shaped
our preferences, not only for the foods that contain the nutrition that we need to survive, but
also for behaviors in social interactions. This line of research is complementary to behavioral
economics, the branch of economics that investigates the explanatory power of richer motiva-
tions than mere self-interest. In the language of evolutionary biology, the focus in behavioral
economics is on the proximate causes of observed human behaviors the neurological, hor-
monal, and psychological mechanisms and triggers that induce us to behave in certain ways.
Here we briey discuss how Homo moralis preferences compare with those considered in this
literature, which is much inspired by research in psychology and sociology.
In the 1970s and 80s, altruistic preferences were proposed to explain intra-family trans-
fers, transfers to the poor, and contributions to public goods (Becker 1974, 1976, Lindbeck and
Weibull, 1988, Andreoni, 1988). However, altruism turned out to be insu¢ cient to explain the
data, and warm glowwas then proposed to enhance the understanding of voluntary contri-
butions to public goods (Andreoni, 1990). In the 1990s, inequity aversion, or a preference for
fairness, was introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as an explanation for why people have
a tendency to turn down low o¤ers in the ultimatum bargaining game (Güth, Schmittberger
and Schwarze, 1982). Still other forms of human motivation that have been proposed, and
sometimes tested, include conformity (Bernheim, 1994), conditional altruism (Levine, 1998),
identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000), and honesty and truth-telling (Alger and Ma, 2003,
Alger and Renault, 2007, Demichelis and Weibull, 2008).
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Although conceptually very di¤erent from Homo moralis, these preferences would be com-
patible with evolutionary stability if they gave rise to the same equilibrium behaviors as those
of Homo moralis.18 For what class of material payo¤ functions such behavioral equivalence ob-
tains remains to be analyzed. Here we will limit ourselves to pointing out that Homo moralis
preferences sometimes give rise to radically di¤erent behaviors compared to preferences that
may appear to be similar. For this purpose consider altruistic preferences. An altruistic indi-
viduals preferences are usually represented as a utility function that attaches unit weight to
the individuals own material payo¤ and a positive weight, less than one, to other individu-
alsmaterial payo¤s. An altruist hence internalizes some of the external e¤ects of his or her
behavior on others. Let the latter weight be denoted , the individuals degree of altruism
towards the other party.19 For some material payo¤ functions an altruist with degree of al-
truism  behaves exactly like a Homo moralis with degree of morality  =  (see Alger and
Weibull, 2013). Hence, in some interactions one cannot discriminate between moralism and
altruism as explanations for observed behavior. However, the two classes of preferences are
conceptually quite distinct, and induce radically di¤erent behaviors in some interactions. This
is particularly striking in interactions with many participants, and in coordination problems
among few or many participants.
To illustrate the rst case, consider again the environmental-economics and the public
goods examples. In the environmental example, morality induced consumers to reduce their
consumption of the harmful good, even though the e¤ect of each individuals consumption
was negligible. In the public goods example, as the number of participants tends to innity,
the individual contribution to the public good tends to a positive amount for any positive
degree of morality. By contrast, Andreoni (1988) has shown that in a population of altruists
the proportion of individuals who make positive donations shrinks to zero as the number of
individuals grows innitely large; for each individual donation then has a negligible e¤ect on
the total value of the public good. There is thus a sharp distinction between morality and
altruism when groups are large. Even if an individual is highly altruistic and cares about the
consequences of her behavior for others, she will behave very much like Homo oeconomicus
if her impact is marginal. By contrast, Homo moralis cares directly about her own behavior,
beyond the e¤ects that this behavior has on her own material payo¤, and this consideration for
the right thing to domakes her behave di¤erently from both selsh and altruistic individuals
in these situations.
18However, Homo moralis are the only preferences that are evolutionarily stable in the whole class of
interactions analyzed in Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016).
19For n = 2, an altruists utility writes u (x; y) =  (x; y) +  (y; x). We note that this function may
also be interpreted as the individual having a concern for e¢ ciency, since it is a monotone transformation of
v (x; y) =  (x; y) +

1  [ (x; y) +  (y; x)].
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This observation may have important implications for other policy issues as well, such as
tax compliance. It has been noted by some economists (see Sandmo, 2005), that there appears
to be less tax evasion in certain countries than would be compatible with Homo oeconomicuss
behavior. The risk of being caught is often small and the penalties mild, so maximization
of expected personal utility would suggest much tax evasion. So why do people in those
countries, and perhaps many in other countries, not evade taxes more? Since the marginal
e¤ect of any change in an individuals tax payment is, with few exceptions, negligible, pro-
social preferences such as altruism or inequity aversion may fail to explain why individuals
evade taxes. However, as suggested by the analysis above, Homo moralis may supply an
explanation, since a Homo moralis may, to a certain extent, prefer to pay their taxes, since
she cares about the moral quality of her actions.
Turning now to the second situation in which Homo moralis preferences give rise to rad-
ically di¤erent behaviors compared to altruism, namely coordination problems, let us briey
consider an example from Alger and Weibull (2013), a simple 22-coordination game in terms
of material payo¤s:
A B
A 2; 2 0; 0
B 0; 0 1; 1
(11)
There are two alternative potential societal conventionswhen individuals pair up to play
this game, namely, that either both parties take action A or both parties take action B. Clearly
the rst convention is Pareto superior to the second. However, under each convention, Homo
oeconomicus has no incentive to unilaterally deviate. Granted a su¢ ciently large population
share act according to the going convention, an individual deviator would looses material
payo¤, and, in addition, incur a payo¤ loss on the unfortunate opponent.20 Therefore also an
altruist would stick to the going convention, even if this happened to be the socially inferior
convention to always take action B. But not so a Homo moralis of high enough degree of
morality. For suppose a Homo kantiensis were to visit an country where (by and large) every
citizen takes action B in every encounter, and suppose that the visitor is indistinguishable
from a citizen. Then Homo kantiensis would take action A in each encounter, since this
would be the right thing to doif upheld as a universal lawof conduct.21 This moralistic
visitor will earn material payo¤ zero in each encounter and so will the unfortunate citizens
who meet him. The citizens would very much wish that the visitor instead had been a Homo
20These are strict Nash equilibria in terms of material payo¤s. The game also has a mixed equilibrium, in
which each individual plays A with probability 1/3. However, this equilibrium is unstable in all plausible pop-
ulation dynamics. See Young (1993) and Myerson and Weibull (2015) for formal models of stable conventions
in large populations.
21Indeed, to take action A is optimal for all Homo moralis with dgree of morality   1=3.
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oeconomicus or an altruist.
A nal point before concluding. Some researchers have developed models in which indi-
viduals care about norms, and/or have a concern for their image (in the eyes of others and
perhaps also in their own eyes) or a desire to avoid social stigma (Lindbeck, Nyberg, and
Weibull, 1999, Brekke, Kverndokk and Nyborg, 2003, Bénabou and Tirole, 2006, Ellingsen
and Johannesson, 2008, Huck, Kübler, and Weibull, 2012). In these models, individuals are
assumed to have a baseline intrinsic wish to behave well,and in addition a wish to be viewed
favorably by others, image concerns that may strengthen the wish to behave well (Falk and
Tirole, 2016). Evidently, we humans are very complex creatures and our behavior is most
likely driven by many motives, what biologists would call proximate causes for our actions.
Biologists distinguish such proximate causes from ultimate causes, by which is meant the rea-
sons for why we exist in the evolutionary race. Our derivation of Homo moralis was based
entirely on such ultimate causes. A closer examination of relations between proximate and
ultimate causes in human motivation is an avenue for future research. Eventually, evolution-
ary theory may help close the open-endedness of behavioral economics, by providing testable
predictions regarding which preferences should be more likely to be sustained than others.
5. Conclusion
In this essay, we have discussed (a) evolutionary foundations for human motivation, (b) how
evolution favors the class of Homo moralis preferences, and (c) implications for economics
and policy of such preferences compared to other preferences. We have sought to convey the
following main points:
1. Economics possesses powerful analytical tools that enable positive and normative analy-
ses of a wide range of social and economic phenomena. These tools should not be
abandoned but brought to more general use.
2. The conventional assumption among economists, since the days of Adam Smiths (1776)
Wealth of Nations, is that economic agents are purely self-interested and focused on
their own consumption. Yet behavioral and experimental economics, insights from the
other social and behavioral sciences, everyday observation, and introspection suggest
that human motivation is much more complex, sometimes systematically deviating from
narrow self-interest.
3. First principles in evolutionary biology, formalized in terms of evolutionary stability
along the lines of Maynard Smith and Price (1973) suggest that, in our simple model
framework, evolution favors human motivation in the form of Homo moralis, a gener-
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alization of Homo oeconomicus that allows for varying degrees of morality alongside
self-interest.
4. By applying the powerful analytical tools of economics to Homo moralis, new predic-
tions and policy recommendations follow. In particular, since Homo moralis is not only
motivated by her material gains and losses, policy based on Homo oeconomicus may
lead to exaggerated use of pecuniary incentives, such as distortionary taxes. If people
do have a natural inclination for moral concerns, it may be more e¤ective to provide the
public with information about the consequences of our actions, for ourselves and others.
Our results being purely theoretical, empirical and experimental work will be necessary
to determine the empirical validity of Homo moralis. To this end, also further theoretical
analysis is needed, for although we have here examined the behavior of Homo moralis in some
common situations, we have but scratched the surface, and, moreover, many fundamental
questions have not been addressed at all. In particular, one fundamental issue that we have
not (yet) addressed is welfare. For economic and social policy, this is a most important, and
yet philosophically non-trivial issue, especially when individuals have socialpreferences. If
individuals have Homo moralis preferences, perhaps idiosyncratic degrees of morality, should
then welfare be dened in terms of the material payo¤s or in terms of individualsutility
functions?
This philosophically and methodologically di¢ cult issue may be related to that addressed
by John Harsanyi in two wonderful essays that deal with game theory, utilitarianism and ethics,
see Harsanyi (1979, 1992). In these essays he advocates what he calls rule utilitarianism,
an approach we nd appealing also for Homo moralis. Harsanyi distinguishes between an
individuals personal preferencesand his or her moral preferences, and advocates that,
when dening welfare in a society, one should only consider the personal preferences. In cases
when individualspreferences can be represented by an additive utility function, where one
term can be taken to represent personal utility, Harsanyi argues that welfare should be
dened as the sum of all individualsexpected personal utilities, behind the veil of ignorance
as to what societal position each individual will end up in. This appears to be in line with
Homo moralis. If we take the material payo¤ function to represent personal utility, then
welfare in a society consisting of Homo moralis individuals (each with his or her degree of
morality) should be dened simply as the sum of their expected material payo¤s, just as in
ordinary utilitarian welfare theory.
To wit, suppose a parent has one selsh and one altruistic child, and has a cake to divide
between them. Suppose also that both children have the same hedonic utility from consump-
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tion, and that this is increasing in the amount consumed, with decreasing marginal utility.22
Should the parent give a bigger slice to the selsh child, thus maximizing the sum of their
altruistic and selsh utilities, or should the parent give them equally large slices, thus max-
imizing the sum of only their hedonic utilities? The second alternative undoubtedly seems
more appealing. The same could be said with one selsh and one spiteful child; taking into
account both childrens total utility, a bigger slice should be given to the spiteful child, but
equal division is, arguably, more reasonable. By contrast, if one child is selsh and the other
instead is inequity averse or a Homo moralis (with any degree of morality), it makes no dif-
ference if the parent considers the childrens total or hedonic (personal) utilities; in any case
their joint welfare is maximized by equal division. Further study of the welfare economics of
Homo moralis and other social preferences is a topic for future research.
A nal point we would like to make concerns the status of economics as a discipline, in the
general public and among the other behavioral and social sciences. Conventional economics
textbooks may give the false impression that selshness is part of economic rationality (see the
discussion in Rubinstein, 2006, and the references therein). This misreading of conventional
economics probably hurts the reputation of economists. If economists would instead use
partly morally motivated agents, such as Homo moralis, then such misunderstandings could
be avoided and the critique would fall at to the ground. The economists analysis would
then not be prejudiced in favor of neither selshness nor morality, but would allow for the
whole spectrum of intermediate degrees of morality, spanning from pure self-interest to pure
Kantian morality.
6. Appendix
In order to give an exact denition of Homo moralis some notation and technicality will be
needed, here kept to a minimum (readers interested in more detail are suggested to consult
Alger and Weibull, 2016). First, let  (x;y) denote the material payo¤ to an individual who
takes course of action x, or, to use game-theoretic jargon, uses strategy x, in a situation when
the other n   1 group members use strategies y = (y1; y2; :::; yn 1).23 Our assumption that
the interaction is aggregative can now be expressed precisely as follows: the material payo¤
 (x;y) is invariant under permutation of the components of the strategy prole y of the other
group members.
We are now in a position to dene Homo moralis.
22This example is due to Peter Diamond, in a conversation many years ago with one of the authors.
23All participants have access to the same set of strategies.
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Denition 1. An individual is a Homo moralis if his or her utility function U satises
U (x;y)  E [ (x; ~y)] where ~y = (~y1; :::; ~yn 1) is a random strategy prole for the other group
members, with each component ~yi being either yi or x, and where the probability distribution
for ~y is such that each component of y is equally likely to be replaced by x.
For any given Homo moralis, let m denote the probability that exactly m of the n   1
components of y are replaced by x (by denition with equal probability for each subset of
size m) while the remaining components of y keep their original values. We will call the so
dened probability vector  the morality prole of that member of Homo moralis.24 Clearly,
Homo oeconomicus is a special member of Homo moralis, namely, the member with morality
prole  = (1; 0; :::; 0). Then Pr [~y = y] = 1 and so its utility is its own material payo¤,
UE (x;y)   (x;y). At the opposite extreme of the spectrum of Homo moralis we nd what
we call Homo kantiensis, those members of the Homo moralis family that have the opposite
morality prole  = (0; :::; 0; 1). Then Pr [~y = (x; x; :::; x)] = 1 and thus their utility function
is UK (x;y)   (x; (x; x; :::; x)). Individuals of this pure Kantianvariety of Homo moralis
always choose a strategy x that, if hypothetically adopted by everyone else in the group would
maximize each group members material payo¤.
The behavior of all other varieties of Homo moralis (that is, with arbitrary morality prole
) lies between these two extremes; they attach some weight to the consequences for their
own material payo¤ and some weight to what would be the right thing to doif their own
behavior became a probabilistically followed universal law. This is most easily seen in the
case of pairwise interactions. For n = 2, the identity U (x;y)  E [ (x; ~y)] boils down to
U (x; y)  0   (x; y) + 1   (x; x). This utility function is a convex combination of pure
selshness (UE) and pure Kantian morality (UK), with weight 0 attached to the rst goal
and the complementary probability weight 1 = 1  0 to the second.25
We show that evolution favors Homo moralis with a morality prole equal to the assorta-
tivity prole in the exogenous random matching process whereby groups are formed. Let us
now turn to this process. Consider any population statein which only two types of individ-
ual are present, those with some utility function U , a type we take to be more frequent, and
those with another utility function V , a type we take to be less frequent. Let the population
share of the latter type be denoted " > 0. We call individuals of the rst type incumbents or
residents and individuals of the second type mutants. In any group that is about to interact,
the number of mutants is a random variable the probability distribution of which depends
on the matching process (which we here take to be exogenous). For any given mutant group
24We note that all m lie between zero and one and that they sum to one.
25In Alger and Weibull (2013) we focus exclusively on the case of pairwise interactions and call 1 the degree
of morality.
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member, let qm (") be the probability that the number of other mutants in his or her group is
m (for m = 0; 1; :::; n  1) and write q (") = (q0 (") ; :::; qn 1 (")) for the so dened probability
distribution. Let q be its limit as "! 0.
For example, under uniform random matching (what biologists refer to as a well-mixed
population), there is almost surely no other mutant in a mutants group, in the limit as the
mutant type becomes vanishingly rare, so then q = (1; 0; 0; :::; 0). By contrast, if groups are
formed exclusively among siblings, who each inherited their type from one of their parents
(with equal probability for both parents), the number of other mutants in a mutants group,
is binomially distributed, with probability parameter p = 1=2.26
For interactions between more than two parties, the utility function of Homo moralis is
mathematically fairly involved. However, this is not always the case. In particular, suppose
that, for any given mutant the types of any two other group members are statistically inde-
pendent.27 Then the evolutionarily stable variety of Homo moralis, that is, the variety with
morality prole equal to the assortativity prole of the matching process, is binomial:
m = q

m =

n  1
m

m (1  )n m 1 (12)
(for any n > 1 and m = 0; 1; ::; n   1), where 0    1 is the probability that a randomly
drawn other group member in a mutants group is also a mutant.
The utility of a member of this subspeciesof Homo moralis is to maximize his or her ex-
pected material payo¤ if, hypothetically, other members of his or her group would randomly
and statistically independently switch to use her strategy with probability . This Homo
moralis subspeciesis thus one-dimensional parametrized by a single number  in the unit
interval and spans from pure selshness (Homo oeconomicus), at  = 0, to pure Kantian
morality (Homo kantiensis), at  = 1. Moreover, in large groups with such conditional
independence, the share of mutants in a mutants group is, by the deMoivre-Laplace Theo-
rem approximately normally distributed with mean value  and variance  (1  ) = (n  1).
Hence, in large groups the share of mutants is almost deterministic and equal to . A Homo
moralis in such large groups acts as if she hypothetically assumed that her behavior were to
become, if not a universal law( = 1), a random lawapplying to a randomly sampled
share of size  out of her groups other members.
26In the limit as mutants become vanishingly rare, a given mutant almost surely has exactly one mutant
parent (the probability of no mutant parent is approximately " and the probability of two mutant parents is
approximately "2). Hence, the probability that any given other sibling is also a mutant is approximately 1=2.
27This restriction on the nature of the matching process is vacuous in the case of pairwise matching and
is always met for siblings (and other relatives in the same generation) under haploid inheritance and sexual
reproduction.
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